

# AID BAD

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## AID BAD FRONTLINE

### **FIRST, AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FAILS – CORRUPTION MEANS MONEY DOES NOT GET TO THE PEOPLE**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

A 2006 World Bank report, meanwhile, estimated that about half of all funds donated for health efforts in sub-Saharan Africa never reach the clinics and hospitals at the end of the line. According to the bank, money leaks out in the form of payments to ghost employees, padded prices for transport and warehousing, the siphoning off of drugs to the black market, and the sale of counterfeit -- often dangerous -- medications. In Ghana, for example, where such corruption is particularly rampant, an amazing 80 percent of donor funds get diverted from their intended purposes.

### **AND, TURN – AID INFLUXES LEADS TO AN INCREASED SCRAMBLE OF RENTS AND OBLITERATES CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT REFORM EFFORTS**

**RANIS 2006** [professor emeritus of economics, “Toward the Enhanced Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”, [http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth\\_pdf/cdp938.pdf](http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp938.pdf)] / ttate

The larger problem, and the larger and more recent disappointment, undoubtedly rests with the failure of aid to have made a positive qualitative impact on recipient country behavior. Today, the general assessment, even by the major donors, including the World Bank, is that the provision of dollars cum advice, coupled with conditionality, has been generally ineffective. There are questions about the extent to which the policies suggested as part of those packages were really flexible enough to fit particular country cases, the extent to which the behavior of recipients was, in fact, affected in a positive way, and last, but not least, whether, in fact, aid ended up infecting recipients with a broader and more virulent strain of the Dutch Disease, one creating a scramble for the additional rents, causing increased corruption, a reduction in checks and balances, and generally impacting decision-making negatively.

### **AND, STOVEPIPING PREVENTS AID EFFECTIVENESS – NARROW FOCUS ON DISEASE AND PROGRAMS MEANS ROOT CAUSES GET IGNORED**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

This points to yet another problem, which is that aid is almost always "stovepiped" down narrow channels relating to a particular program or disease. From an operational perspective, this means that a government may receive considerable funds to support, for example, an ARV-distribution program for mothers and children living in the nation's capital. But the same government may have no financial capacity to support basic maternal and infant health programs, either in the same capital or in the country as a whole. So HIV-positive mothers are given drugs to hold their infection at bay and prevent passage of the virus to their babies but still cannot obtain even the most rudimentary of obstetric and gynecological care or infant immunizations.

Stovepiping tends to reflect the interests and concerns of the donors, not the recipients. Diseases and health conditions that enjoy a temporary spotlight in rich countries garner the most attention and money. This means that advocacy, the whims of foundations, and the particular concerns of wealthy individuals and governments drive practically the entire global public health effort. Today the top three killers in most poor countries are maternal death around childbirth and pediatric respiratory and intestinal infections leading to death from pulmonary failure or uncontrolled diarrhea. But few women's rights groups put safe pregnancy near the top of their list of priorities, and there is no dysentery lobby or celebrity attention given to coughing babies.

## **AID BAD FRONTLINE**

### **AND, LACK OF COORDINATION DOOMS SOLVENCY**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

Another problem is the lack of coordination of donor activities. Improving global health will take more funds than any single donor can provide, and oversight and guidance require the skills of the many, not the talents of a few compartmentalized in the offices of various groups and agencies. In practice, moreover, donors often function as competitors, and the only organization with the political credibility to compel cooperative thinking is the WHO. Yet, as Harvard University's Christopher Murray points out, the WGO itself is dependent on donors, who give it much more for disease-specific programs than they do for its core budget. If the WHO stopped chasing such funds, Murray argues, it could go back to concentrating on its true mission of providing objective expert advice and strategic guidance.

### **AND, BUREAUCRACY MISMANAGEMENT PREVENTS AID FROM BEING EFFECTIVE**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

One problem is that not all the funds appropriated end up being spent effectively. In an analysis prepared for the second annual meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative, in September 2006, Dalberg Global Development Advisors concluded that much current aid spending is trapped in bureaucracies and multilateral banks. Simply stripping layers of financing bureaucracy and improving health-delivery systems, the firm argued, could effectively release an additional 15-30 percent of the capital provided for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs.

### **AND, PERSONNEL SHIFT – PLAN CAUSES SHIFT OF TALENTED MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO THEIR PROJECT AND AWAY FROM GENERAL HEALTH SERVICES**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

As in Haiti, even as money has poured into Ghana for HIV/AIDS and malaria programs, the country has moved backward on other health markers. Prenatal care, maternal health programs, the treatment of guinea worm, measles vaccination efforts -- all have declined as the country has shifted its health-care workers to the better-funded projects and lost physicians to jobs in the wealthy world. A survey of Ghana's health-care facilities in 2002 found that 72 percent of all clinics and hospitals were unable to provide the full range of expected services due to a lack of sufficient personnel. Forty-three percent were unable to provide full child immunizations; 77 percent were unable to provide 24-hour emergency services and round-the-clock safe deliveries for women in childbirth. According to Dr. Ken Sagoe, of the Ghana Health Service, these statistics represent a severe deterioration in Ghana's health capacity. Sagoe also points out that 604 out of 871 medical officers trained in the country between 1993 and 2002 now practice overseas.

## AID BAD FRONTLINE

### **AND, LACK OF CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING – WESTERN AID UTILIZES WESTERN APPROACHES – PUBLIC HEALTH PRIORITIES GET SKEWED AWAY FROM DOMESTIC APPROACHES**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

Finally, major influxes of foreign funding can raise important questions about national control and the skewing of health-care policies toward foreign rather than domestic priorities. Many governments and activists complain that the U.S. government, in particular, already exerts too much control over the design and emphasis of local HIV/AIDS programs. This objection is especially strong regarding HIV-prevention programs, with claims that the Bush administration has pushed abstinence, fidelity, and faith-based programs at the expense of locally generated condom- and needle-distribution efforts.

### **AND, TURN – FALSE HOPE**

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 209] / ttate

Contrary to conventional recommendations, direct foreign aid to most African countries should be reduced, not increased. Out of necessity, leaner budgets would be better managed. There would be greater competition for resources among nations and more time to select, prepare, and supervise projects in the few countries that met stringent criteria.

Some of the saving from direct country aid could be channeled to more general purposes such as the establishment of regional universities, multi-country infrastructure projects, agricultural research, and cross-border HIV/AIDS initiatives. Such efforts would benefit several countries at a time or, for that matter, the entire continent.

Abundant aid offers false hope, dampens the initiative to develop the continent's own resources, including its people, and calms Western consciences while dulling them to the even greater horrors that lie ahead. Bad policy and the continued departure of trained personnel will exacerbate the spread of disease, famine, unemployment, and desperation. Only political change can offer hope of a turnaround on those fronts.

### **AND, YOU DON'T HAVE SUPPORT OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE – AFRICANS DON'T BELIEVE FOREIGN AID CAN SOLVE**

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 165] / ttate

The ultimate indictment of foreign aid is that few Africans themselves believe in it. Shortly after I arrived in Abidjan to head the World Bank's regional office for Western Africa, a leading businessman – tough, American-trained, and plain spoken – nearly knocked me out of my seat when I visited him with some rather sharp words: “What do you know about our government that we don't? I hope you don't believe in all these musical chairs they call ‘democracy’ around here. Why are you lending them any money? I certainly wouldn't.” That challenge rang in my ears during the next three years in the country – and still does.

## **AID BAD FRONTLINE**

### **AND, TURN – LOCAL REFORMS:**

#### **LARGE INFLUX OF FOREIGN AID TRADES-OFF WITH LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING**

**MINNEAPOLIS 2002**

[Larry, director @ Humanitarianism and War Project, THE HUMANITARIANISM  
ENTERPRISE: DILEMMAS AND DISCOVERIES, page 60 / ttate]

Yet Africa in recent years has received so much foreign aid, the same analyst notes, that its own humanitarian traditions have become obscured. One bellwether of the destructiveness of the Sudan's civil war has been the erosion of the country's vaunted traditions of hospitality across the dividing lines of tribe, race, and religion. In various other countries, too, massive population displacement and its longer-term social, economic, and ethnic impacts have eroded deeply rooted traditions. Daghestani hospitality toward the tens of thousands of displaced Chechens waned considerably when small numbers of Chechen fighters began to use their country of refuge as a launching pad for attacks on Russian federal forces.

## AID BAD FRONTLINE

**AND, TURN - Aid to African countries is a ploy by western nations to keep communistic dictators in power to prevent another rising economic power.**

**Walker, 04**

(Bill, Research associate in telomere biology, "Aid to Dependent Dictators," November 22<sup>nd</sup>, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/walker1.html>)

Of course, "tiny" expenditures on foreign dictators add up. Unfortunately, no one can tell you exactly what they add up to, because foreign aid is dispersed and cloaked better than the CIA budget. Official foreign aid is the smallest part of the cost; the majority of foreign Aid today is arranged in back-room deals between money-center banks, dictators, and the Federal Reserve. The "official" foreign aid figures are a lower limit. Even this lower limit is an incredible figure. At an absolute minimum, since WWII more than a trillion dollars has been transferred from US taxpayers to unfree regimes. What would this trillion dollars have become, if left in the private sector? How many trillions of private wealth? And how much of this private wealth would have been invested in the more-free parts of the Third World, providing real jobs and real pride to people who now live in hopeless dependence? Of course, we will never know. Perhaps we would have seen a cancer cure by now, perhaps Mars would have been terraformed, perhaps Washington DC would have had a legitimate baseball stadium instead of a tax-financed atrocity. A multi-trillion-dollar hole in the world economy is too big to visualize. The real dollar cost of foreign aid is the sum of all official aid, plus all US military commitments not related to US security, plus all bank "loans" to Third World and communist governments. The majority of these anti-capitalist regimes will never be able to, or be interested in, repaying any of this money. The Warsaw Pact alone was estimated to have owed about two hundred billion dollars to Western banks at the time the Berlin Wall fell. Since then, of course, the pace of "loans" to parasite governments has increased dramatically. Counting our continuing defense subsidy to the wealthy nations of Europe and the Pacific Rim, and counterproductive military commitments to puppet regimes in Iraq and elsewhere, US foreign aid must be well over two hundred billion dollars per year. **The World Bank** Even the official foreign aid agencies use accounting methods that make Enron look like a model of honesty and transparency. The [World Bank](#) handed out more than 17 billion dollars in 2001. But you won't find \$17 billion worth of expenditures in the official budgets of the funding nations. The 1994 Cato Institute book, *Perpetuating Poverty*, found that in 1992 the US Congress placed only 3 percent of its World Bank contribution on the budget. The other 97 percent was in "callable capital pledges," i.e. illegal, unconstitutional, off-the-books debt. Most of the World Bank's money comes from the sale of bonds, backed by these off-the-books "callable pledges." This relatively minor source of foreign aid still gave away \$17 billion in one year. While \$17 billion might be only a moderate expenditure for Bill Gates, this much money can buy a lot of AK-47s and barbed wire in countries that have per capita incomes less than 400 dollars per year. The good news about the World Bank is that it wastes a high proportion of its money on administrative costs, more than \$1.3 billion in 2002. After all, every dollar spent on overpaid bureaucrats is a dollar less for forced relocation programs, rainforest destruction, and dam projects. And to be fair, while the Bank's financing may be shady, it issues lots of good reports on the failures of its own programs. In the Bank reports you can read of the bulging Swiss bank accounts of government officials, and the environmental damage Bank projects have caused to the rain forests in Indonesia and Brazil. The bad news is that the only solution the Bank proposes is that we give it more money. **The IMF** Another of the official sources of foreign aid, the [IMF](#), explains some of its financing methods as follows on its web site: "Off-market transactions in gold. In December 1999, the Executive Board authorized off-market transactions in gold of up to 14 million ounces to help finance IMF participation in the HIPC Initiative. Between December 1999 and April 2000, separate but closely linked transactions involving a total of 12.9 million ounces of gold were carried out between the IMF and two members (Brazil and Mexico) that had financial obligations falling due to the IMF. In the first step, the IMF sold gold to the member at the prevailing market price and the profits were placed in a special account and then invested for the benefit of the HIPC Initiative. In the second step, the IMF immediately accepted back, at the same market price, the same amount of gold from the member in settlement of that member's financial obligations falling due to the Fund. The net effect of these transactions was to leave the balance of the IMF's holdings of physical gold unchanged." As you can see, Enron accountants have a lot to learn from foreign aid bureaucrats. Speaking of gold, the IMF claims that gold is not important in today's monetary markets, which is no doubt why the IMF hoards only a bit more than \$32 billion dollars worth of the valueless metal. The IMF claims total currency assets of 290 billion dollars. The IMF also maintains a credit line of \$40 billion. How much of this leaks away per year? I don't know how to answer that question, except to say "all of it." None of this money is going to get back into the private sector except for the part that is stolen and invested through numbered Cayman Islands bank accounts. Let's hope that's a large proportion. **The UN** Yet another source of off-the-books income for the world's monarchs and oligarchs is the United Nations. In addition to dollars, the UN provides free pro-government mercenaries. Upon a "democratic" vote of UN representatives (the majority of whom are representing either dictators or regimes which are "democratic" in theory at best... most of the world's elections are just as phony as those run by Diebold), armies of "peacekeepers" can be raised and used to support leaders so unpopular in their own countries that they can't even hire their own thugs. The US provides a disproportionate share of the UN's income, not least of which is the UN dues from minor dictators... paid out of their US aid money. **USAID** Working our way down to the small fry of the aid world, we come to USAID. Unlike the bigger players, [USAID actually has an annual budget request figure you can look up, along with some wild guesses as to other US agency aid expenditures](#) (their guess for FY 2004 is 38 billion) For FY 2005, the "official" figure is only \$8,880,800,00 (but notice that "supplemental" expenditures were almost four billion in FY 2004, and there is no reason to believe that any less will be spent this year). So USAID is only hitting up the taxpayer for less than thirteen billion every year. It doesn't sound that bad, surely not as bad as the Department of Agriculture's mammoth domestic economic drain. But the real problem is the effect on the aid recipients. What does massive aid to a government mean to that nation's citizens? Let's look at a few of the most famous cases: There is a persistent myth that foreign aid rebuilt Germany and Japan after World War II. I don't know how this myth persists when it is so easy to look up the figures on the 1948 Marshall Plan. There is a perfect reverse correlation between Marshall Plan expenditures and development. The lion's share of Marshall plan money went to England, which recovered very poorly after WWII. Then France was pummeled with Marshall help, keeping it down as well. Austria and Greece were also proportionally large recipients, and proportionally slow in recovery. (One of the many features of Marshall "help" was that any Marshall expenditure had to be matched with taxes from the donor country, causing a maximization of public sector vs. private sector growth.)

## EXTS - #1 – CORRUPTION

### ( ) Increases in African aid will go to corrupt governments increasing poverty

#### **Peron, 02**

(Jim, writer for The Objectivist Center who lives in Africa, “Foreign Aid to Africa Won’t Help, and it May Very Well Hurt,” Objectivistcenter.org, 3-21)

Just an extra \$100 billion of so can eradicate world poverty, says Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs.

His claim is that if the West, particularly the United States, were to give this money to poor countries, it would meet the “needs of the world’s poorest people” and this generation could “free humanity from poverty’s iron grip”.

Sounds nice. But there are problems. In his editorial, which appeared in numerous papers around the world, Sachs never actually lays out where the money should go. He wants to dramatically increase aid to the poor but he neglects to mention how.

And that’s critical. Foreign aid historically has gone to governments in the third world - governments that, even by the most liberal of standards, are corrupt and tyrannical. Aid, instead of helping the poor, helps those who oppress the poor. Government to government aid does nothing to diminish poverty and probably increases it.

Aid money is routinely diverted to military projects and often used to finance policing techniques that make sure the ruling elite stays in power. This doesn’t even include the huge sums of aid that end up in Swiss bank accounts as a “retirement” plan for African dictators in case the policing fails. And aid in the form of food only destroys the ability of local farmers to make a living.

### **Corruption guts solvency—80 percent of funds are stolen**

Marian Tupy, analyst with the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, and Christopher Preble, Cato’s director of foreign policy studies, 6-17-5 (“Trade, not Aid,” <http://www.reason.com/news/show/32936.html>) / awh

Some want to correct that problem by increasing foreign aid, but transfer payments have failed to stimulate economic growth in Africa where the average income per person is 11 percent lower today than it was in 1960. State-to-state aid is inefficient because it is often based on geopolitical considerations, not on economic criteria. As a consequence, the least deserving regimes often obtain aid. International organizations such as the World Bank are also largely ineffective. In 2000, for example, the bipartisan Meltzer Commission found that the World Bank’s aid projects failed 55 to 60 percent of the time. The aid is ineffective because of the appalling way in which Africa is governed. In recent decades, of each dollar given to Africa in aid, 80 cents were stolen by corrupt leaders and transferred back into Western bank accounts. In total, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo estimated, “corrupt African leaders have stolen at least \$140 billion from their people in the [four] decades since independence.” All that is left when these regimes eventually collapse is a massive public debt.

### **Aid fails—governments steal**

#### **USA Today, March 98**

([http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1272/is\\_n2634\\_v126/ai\\_20409127](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_n2634_v126/ai_20409127)) / awh

The results of past policy-oriented lending are not much cause for confidence. Many governments simply are not interested in policy reform. Some of them want their countries to develop, but are unwilling to pay the political price for adopting the policies necessary to do so. Others treat ideological objectives as paramount. Still others are most interested in staying in power. Such regimes usually are an impediment to development. According to Alan Carter of Heythrop College in London, “Third World states are neither the instruments of international capital nor of an indigenous bourgeoisie, but are rational actors who will industrialize their economies when practicable, but who often find it in their interests to be accomplices in the dependent development or even underdevelopment of their own economies.” In such cases, he warns, “aid primarily serves to prop up regimes that are complicit in the exploitation of their people and the destruction of their environment.” That has been the experience of the IMF and the World Bank, which for years supposedly have been underwriting policy “reform” around the world. Most governments simply have taken the money and run, causing those taxpayer-funded organizations to extend new loans.

## EXTS - #1 – CORRUPTION

### ( ) CORRUPTION HIGH IN AFRICA

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 90] / ttate

Corruption is endemic in Africa for the same reasons as elsewhere. But it hurts the continent more than other regions, is more brazen, and is accepted more readily. As much of the elite is involved, and the poor are powerless, there is little pressure for change. Even when people at the top become too greedy and cut off opportunities for others, those below them have little interest in shaking the ladder they are standing on. People in power or professional positions are more likely to lose than gain from political upheaval. Even opposition groups do not want to change the system very much, as they await their turn to exploit it themselves. It is hardly surprising that anti-corruption campaigns rarely bite. Their purpose is public relations and the intended audience is largely foreign.

### ( ) CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS PREVENTS AID FROM BEING EFFECTIVE

**GARDINIER 2005** [Nile, PhD and fellow of Anglo-American Security Policy @ Heritage Foundation, "The G-8 Summit: Advancing US Interests in Africa", [www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm784.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm784.cfm) / ttate]

There is no guarantee that Western aid will be used properly by Third World countries. All too often, foreign aid has enriched political elites in Africa and Asia, while failing to benefit ordinary people. A perfect example has been that of Africa's most populous country, Nigeria, whose rulers for 40 years squandered the wealth of an oil rich nation that possesses vast natural resources. Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, set up in 2002, recently revealed that the country's previous rulers misused or stole £220 billion (\$400 billion) in the period between independence from Britain in 1960 and 1999, when the country returned to civilian rule.

### **Aid entrenches dictators and isn't traced.**

**USA Today, March 98**

([http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1272/is\\_n2634\\_v126/ai\\_20409127](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_n2634_v126/ai_20409127))

Few programs have consumed as many resources with as few positive results as has foreign aid. Since World War II, the U. S. alone has contributed more than one trillion dollars in bilateral assistance to various countries. Other nations, directly and through such U. S.-funded multilateral institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United Nations, have provided hundreds of billions of dollars more. Yet, the recipients of that largess, by and large, have failed to grow economically and develop democratically. In many cases, it has underwritten brutal dictators as they have pillaged their peoples; in other instances, Western financial flows have subsidized the creation of disastrously inefficient state-led development programs. Often, Washington and other sources of aid have backed regimes that were both corrupt and collectivist. Even many advocates of continued foreign assistance acknowledge the disappointing results of past policies. For instance, the U. S. Agency for International Development admitted in 1993 that "much of the investment financed by U. S. AID and other donors between 1960 and 1980 has disappeared without a trace." U.S. AID administrator Brian Atwood says of the assistance to Zaire, "The investment of over \$2,000,000,000 of American foreign aid served no purpose."

## EXTS - #1 – CORRUPTION

**Foreign aid to Africa doesn't work – corrupt governments, bad farm subsidy policies, and protectionism prevent it from working.**

**Tupy and Preble, 05**

(Marian and Christopher, policy analyst with the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity and director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, "Trade, Not Aid," ReasonOnline, June 17<sup>th</sup>, <http://www.reason.com/news/show/32936.html>)

When British Prime Minister Tony Blair met with President Bush last week, he urged the United States to increase substantially its aid to Africa. Pressure on Mr. Bush is likely to multiply over the coming weeks as he prepares to depart for the G8 summit in Scotland. Despite political pressures, increasing the U.S. foreign aid budget would be a mistake. The true cause of Africa's poverty is the continent's long history of crippling misgovernance—a problem that is exacerbated by rich countries' trade protectionism, particularly with respect to agriculture. While advocates of current market-distorting agricultural policies do not intend to harm developing nations, the collective effect of U.S. farm policies is devastating for producers of agricultural goods worldwide. American farm policies might provide short-term benefits for agricultural producers in the U.S., but those benefits are more than offset by the cost to American consumers who pay higher taxes to support the U.S. farmers and higher prices for agricultural products. Meanwhile, U.S. tariffs, quotas, and export subsidies exacerbate poverty in regions like sub-Saharan Africa where people are heavily dependent upon agriculture. The frustration and despair caused by these policies in turn undermine American security. People who are dependent upon agriculture for their survival often have limited access to information. Unfamiliar with the historical and economic rationale behind U.S. agricultural policies, those individuals perceive U.S. farm policies to fit neatly within a competing narrative crafted by doomsayers who claim that the United States seeks to keep the rest of the world shackled in poverty. Protestations to the contrary from U.S. government officials typically fall on deaf ears. U.S. agriculture policy undermines U.S. efforts to alleviate poverty because it drives down global agricultural prices, which in turn cost developing countries hundreds of millions of dollars in lost export earnings. The losses associated with cotton subsidies alone exceed the value of U.S. aid programs to the countries concerned. The British aid organization Oxfam charges that U.S. subsidies directly led to losses of more than \$300 million in potential revenue in sub-Saharan Africa during the 2001/02 season. More than 12 million people in this region depend directly on the crop, with a typical small-scale producer making less than \$400 on an annual cotton harvest. By damaging the livelihoods of people already on the edge of subsistence, U.S. agricultural policies take away with the right hand what the left hand gives in aid and development assistance. Some want to correct that problem by increasing foreign aid, but transfer payments have failed to stimulate economic growth in Africa where the average income per person is 11 percent lower today than it was in 1960. State-to-state aid is inefficient because it is often based on geopolitical considerations, not on economic criteria. As a consequence, the least deserving regimes often obtain aid. International organizations such as the World Bank are also largely ineffective. In 2000, for example, the bipartisan Meltzer Commission found that the World Bank's aid projects failed 55 to 60 percent of the time. The aid is ineffective because of the appalling way in which Africa is governed. In recent decades, of each dollar given to Africa in aid, 80 cents were stolen by corrupt leaders and transferred back into Western bank accounts. In total, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo estimated, "corrupt African leaders have stolen at least \$140 billion from their people in the [four] decades since independence." All that is left when these regimes eventually collapse is a massive public debt. There is yet another practical problem with the "subsidies plus aid" approach. It forces taxpayers to pay twice—once to sustain the inefficient subsidies, and then again to pay for aid programs to those countries harmed by such policies. William R. Cline, senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics and the Center for Global Development, estimated that global trade liberalization would save the developed nations \$141 billion a year and deliver economic benefits worth \$87 billion a year to developing countries. To the extent that U.S. security depends upon the expansion of liberal democratic institutions and free market economics, U.S. policymakers must be particularly sensitive to those policies that exacerbate poverty in the developing world. As Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni stated during his 2003 meeting with President Bush, "I don't want aid; I want trade. Aid cannot transform society." Development economists have stressed this message for years. U.S. subsidies and protectionism are particularly galling for those countries that have tried to make market reforms work, only to see their producers undercut by subsidized goods in the "free" world market. Even though the United States is hardly the worst offender in the developed world when it comes to unfair trading practices, the United States should lead by example and eliminate its market-distorting agricultural policies. They are damaging to the interests of most Americans, and they render useless U.S. efforts to alleviate poverty in the poorest corners of the globe.

## EXTS -- #4 – LACK OF COORDINATION

### (\_) LACK OF COORDINATION AND UNITY OF RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS ALSO DOOMS SOLVENCY

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 31-2]/ttate

This failure of African countries to achieve greater unity is striking after 40 years of grand ideas, resolutions, organizations, and considerable money devoted to overcoming the continent's divisions. There are now 23 major regional organization and innumerable smaller ones. The largest is the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), headquartered in Addis Ababa, which has 53 members. Sub-regional bodies include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC); and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). Some – like the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) – are focused on particular problems. Others, like the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), have only two or three members. But all are best known for pompous officials, padded budgets, stuffy reports, and incessant self-congratulation, rather than for any real progress in pooling national interests.

The Union of African Parliaments has been blunt about this. At its 21<sup>st</sup> annual meeting in August 1998, it complained about “redundant organizations,” “overlapping functions,” “unbalanced structures, non-competent appointments, non-payment of contributions and lack of resources,” and asked member states to show greater political commitment to these bodies. It also suggested that African regional groupings should work more closely with each other.

## EXTS -- #5 – BUREAUCRACY

### ( ) BUREAUCRACY PREVENTS EFFECTIVE AID DISTRIBUTION

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 163-4] / ttate

Few aid initiatives are really local and well thought out, and money rarely reaches its intended target. Even Uganda, one of the few African countries with a functioning government, found in 1998 that less than 30 percent of the funds dedicated to primary education was actually reaching the schools. Not all of the missing money was stolen or wasted; some of it was re-appropriated to other priorities by middle-level officials. Another complicating factor is the basic clash of values between Africans and Westerners (see Chapter 11). African leaders are now willing to talk about “poverty” and will even wrinkle their brows about “governance,” but they prefer to have these discussions with foreign visitors rather than their own countrymen. In some countries, poverty studies have been suppressed to prevent leaks of embarrassing information. In the meantime, aid agencies keep churning out projects, some African officials try to cooperate, others try to derive personal advantage, and the African public keeps staring in disbelief at the ineffectiveness of the whole process.

## EXTS - #5 - BUREAUCRACY

**Foreign aid bureaucracies are inefficient – they are unable to receive feedback or operate like a normal bureaucracy.**

**Easterly, 02**

(William, Author of “The White Man’s Burden: Why The West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest have done so Much Ill and So Little Good,” Center for Global Development, “The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid, October)

**Why does the business of delivering foreign aid services to poor people in poor countries**

**involve so much unproductive bureaucracy?** It’s not that aid bureaucrats are bad; in fact many smart, hard-working, dedicated professionals toil away in the world’s top aid agencies. But the perverse incentives they face explain the organizations’ obtuse behavior. **Bureaucracy works best where there is high feedback from**

**beneficiaries, high incentives for the bureaucracy to respond to such feedback, easily**

**observable outcomes, high probability that bureaucratic effort will translate into favorable**

**outcomes, and competitive pressure from other bureaucracies and agencies.** In short, **bureaucracy**

**works best when it functions something like a free market.** **All of these conditions are unfavorable in foreign**

**aid. Although a poor person in Ethiopia can easily observe a pothole outside his house, it is**

**hard for a foreign aid agency to continuously observe how country B’s pothole prevalence.**

Moreover, **it is very hard for aid bureaucracies to get constructive feedback from past mistakes,** like

financing a road full of potholes. There is a large literature that makes these common sense points. See especially Wilson 1989. The World Bank’s 2001 World Development Report on Institutions presented evidence that direct election of individual politicians, more political competition, and a free and independent media reduced bureaucratic corruption and improved public service delivery. Djankov et al. 2001 similarly finds that government domination of the media worsens social service delivery. La Porta et al. 1998 found that more democratic governments were more efficient and delivered more public goods, as were governments bound by common law rather than civil or socialist law (arguing that common law gives more voice to citizens). Kaufmann et al 2001 and Kaufmann et al 2002 show how bureaucracies in Bolivia with more citizen voice and more transparency deliver a higher quality and quantity of public services. Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett 1995 found that countries with civil liberties had higher returns on aid projects. Pritchett and Woolcock 2002 describe the failure of the bureaucratic model in public service delivery under unfavorable conditions in poor countries. potholes,

because any admission of past failure is a threat to getting new aid resources to dispense in the future. Additional bureaucratic aid

agency effort at fixing potholes in country B will likely miscarry, given the absence of feedback and the dependence of the

outcome on government officials and other agents in country B outside of the agency’s control. If poor countries are poor because

of bad government and other collective action problems, then bureaucratic effort in those countries is less likely to succeed than in

rich countries. Finally the industrial structure of foreign aid limits competitive pressure on aid agencies, who make up a “cartel of

good intentions”. **Bureaucracy** in foreign aid evolved to face a hostile environment. The resulting edifice of national and

international bureaucracies has not provided services effectively to the world’s poor. Despite numerous attempts at reform,

bureaucratic characteristics of foreign aid stayed remarkably persistent throughout its fifty year history. The tragedy is that

**bureaucracy captured foreign aid under conditions in which it didn’t work well.**

## **EXTS -- #6-- LACK OF PERSONNEL**

### **( ) ZIMBABWE PROVES OUR PERSONNEL ARGUMENT – BRAIN DRAIN AND HIV/AIDS IS DEVASTATING POOL OF AVAILABLE PERSONNEL**

**GARRETT 2007** [Laurie, senior fellow for Global Health @ Council on Foreign Relations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86103-p20/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-health.html> / ttate]

Zimbabwe, similarly, trained 1,200 doctors during the 1990s, but only 360 remain in the country today. In Kadoma, eight years ago there was one nurse for every 700 residents; today there is one for every 7,500. In 1980, the country was able to fill 90 percent of its nursing positions nationwide; today only 30 percent are filled. Guinea-Bissau has plenty of donated ARV supplies for its people, but the drugs are cooking in a hot dockside warehouse because the country lacks doctors to distribute them. In Zambia, only 50 of the 600 doctors trained over the last 40 years remain today. Mozambique's health minister says that AIDS is killing the country's health-care workers faster than they can be recruited and trained: by 2010, the country will have lost 6,000 lab technicians to the pandemic. A study by the International Labor Organization estimates that 18-41 percent of the health-care labor force in Africa is infected with HIV. If they do not receive ARV therapy, these doctors, nurses, and technicians will die, ushering in a rapid collapse of the very health systems on which HIV/AIDS programs depend.

## EXTS - #9 – AFRICANS DON'T WANT

( ) Aid ineffective—anti-American sentiment kills influence

International Herald Tribune, 12-24-6

(<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/12/24/africa/web.1224WIRgettleman.php>) /awh

"Down, down U. S.A.!" thousands of Somalis yelled, many of them waving cocked Kalashnikovs. "Slit the throats of the Americans!" Not exactly soothing words, especially when the passport in your pocket has one of those golden eagles on it. Somalia may be the place that best illustrates a trend sweeping across the African continent: After Sept. 11, 2001, the United States concluded that anarchy and misery aid terrorism, and so it tried to re-engage Africa. But anti-American sentiment on the continent has only grown, and become increasingly nasty. And the United States seems unable to do much about it. 2006 in photos Zoom in Images tracing the past year's headline news. » View Today in Africa & Middle East Promised aid slow to arrive in war-torn southern Lebanon Hamas force returns stolen lion, minus claws and teeth, to Gaza zoo Around 150, death toll in Iraq attack among war's worst A number of experts on Africa trace those developments to a sense not of American power, but of its decline — a perception that the United States is no longer the only power that counts, that it is too bogged down in the Middle East to be a real threat here, and so it can be ignored or defied with impunity. American officials, for example, acknowledge that they are at a loss about what to do about the on-again, off-again Somali crisis, which cracked open last week when the two forces dueling for power blasted away at each other in their first major confrontation. In this case, there are a lot of reasons why many of the people don't like Americans, starting with the United States' botched efforts to play peacemaker in the early 1990s to its current support for Ethiopia, which is taking sides in Somalia's internal politics. But the broader issue playing out here — the sense that the United States is not the kingmaker it once was — goes beyond Mogadishu. It is Africa-wide. And it is based on a changed reality: the emergence of other customers for Africa's resources and the tying down of American military forces in Iraq have combined to reduce American clout in sub-Saharan Africa, even as the United States pumps in more financial aid than ever — about \$4 billion per year — and can still claim to be the one superpower left standing. "The actual ability of the U. S. to influence circumstances on the ground in Africa has declined dramatically," said Michael Clough, a former director of the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But the symbolic significance of the United States is still there. So we become the perfect target." For proof, please see Sudan, Congo, Eritrea, northern Nigeria to a lesser extent, and even South Africa.

## EXTS -- #10 – LOCAL REFORMS

**Western aid is ineffective – it weakens local markets by empowering dictators and corrupt bureaucracy.**

### **Spiegel, 05**

(Spiegel Online, International Magazine, “For God’s Sake, Please Stop the Aid,” July 4<sup>th</sup>, interview conducted by Thilo Thielk)

An Kenyan expert in economics, James Shikwati, was interviewed by the German magazine Der Spiegel. [The interview](#) got off to a quick start as Shikwati surprised the journalist. **SPIEGEL:**Mr. Shikwati, the G8 summit at Gleneagles is about to beef up the development aid for Africa... **Shikwati:** ... for God's sake, please just stop. **SPIEGEL:** Stop? The industrialized nations of the West want to eliminate hunger and poverty.

**Shikwati:** Such intentions have been damaging our continent for the past 40 years. If the industrial nations really want to help the Africans, they should finally terminate this awful aid. The countries that have collected the most development aid are also the ones that are in the worst shape. Despite the billions that have poured in to Africa, the continent remains poor.

Massive injections of money, good intentions, and virtually nothing to show for it. Sounds just like the welfare state here. The journalist is confused, bewildered. **SPIEGEL:** Do you have an explanation for this paradox? Why is it a paradox if it simply a case of doing what doesn't work on a much larger scale? This exposes the incredibly simplistic assumption on the part of liberal ideology that throwing money a a problem really should work...in theory. As conservatives have been arguing for decades, however, an understanding of economics helps explain this "paradox". In

answer to the question, Shikwati explains. **Shikwati:** Huge bureaucracies are financed (with the aid money), corruption and complacency are promoted, Africans are taught to be beggars and not to be independent. In addition, development aid weakens the local markets everywhere and dampens the spirit of entrepreneurship that we so desperately need. As absurd as it may sound: Development aid is one of the reasons for Africa's problems. If the West were to cancel these payments, normal Africans wouldn't even notice. Only the functionaries would be hard hit. Which is why they maintain that the world would stop turning without this development aid.

Being taught to be beggars, dependence on government, dampening entrepreneurship, and government corruption involved in the cash transfer. Sounds just like the welfare...well, you get the idea. Well, now our journalist is flummoxed. Doesn't *someone* have to help them? Shikwati slaps down this dependency thinking, and explains how food shipments both prop up corrupt governments and at the same time destroy the local economy's incentive. **SPIEGEL:** Even in a country like Kenya, people are starving to death each year. Someone has got to help them. **Shikwati:** But it has

to be the Kenyans themselves who help these people. When there's a drought in a region of Kenya, our corrupt politicians reflexively cry out for more help. This call then reaches the United Nations World Food Program -- which is a massive agency of apparatchiks who are in the absurd situation of, on the one hand, being dedicated to the fight against hunger while, on the other hand, being faced with unemployment were hunger actually eliminated. It's only natural that they willingly accept the plea for more help. And it's not uncommon that they demand a little more money than the respective African government originally requested. They then forward that request to their headquarters, and before long, several thousands tons of corn are shipped to Africa ... **SPIEGEL:** ... corn that predominantly comes from highly-subsidized European and American farmers ... **Shikwati:** ... and at some point, this corn ends up in the harbor of

Mombasa. A portion of the corn often goes directly into the hands of unsrupulous politicians who then pass it on to their own tribe to boost their next election campaign. Another portion of the shipment ends up on the black market where the corn is

dumped at extremely low prices. Local farmers may as well put down their hoes right away; no one can compete with the UN's World Food Program. And because the farmers go under in the face of this pressure, Kenya would have no reserves to draw on if there actually were a famine next year. It's a simple but fatal cycle.

And it just gets better after that. It included an admission from a tyrant that they indeed waste the aid, a exposure of exaggerated AIDS numbers for profit, and an African biochemist stuck being a chauffeur to aid workers. You simply must read the whole thing. It really turns on its head the idea that huge amounts of aid helps a nation, or even a continent. Giving to the poor is one thing. Destroying the individual spirit by destroying their livelihood is entirely another. The interview concludes with the journalist, playing the part of the liberal to the hilt (and, based on the full interview, not really play-acting) asking in desperation...

**SPIEGEL:** What are the Germans supposed to do?

**Shikwati:** If they really want to fight poverty, they should completely halt development aid and give Africa the opportunity to ensure its own survival. Currently, Africa is like a child that immediately cries for its babysitter when something goes wrong. Africa should stand on its own two feet.

**Turn—aid kills potential reform and countries spend the aid on useless projects.**

**Richard Posner**, judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 7-11-5

([http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/07/foreign\\_aid\\_to.html](http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/07/foreign_aid_to.html))

I do not favor foreign aid, debt relief (which is simply another form of such aid), or other financial transfers to poor countries, in Africa or anywhere else. Countries that are not corrupt do not require foreign aid, and foreign aid to corrupt countries entrenches corruption by increasing the gains to corruption. Foreign aid to

Zimbabwe, for example, will simply prop up dictator Mugabe. Foreign aid makes people in wealthy countries feel generous, but retards reform in those countries as well as in the donee countries. Obviously from a world welfare as well as African welfare standpoint Europe and the United States should not impose tariffs on agricultural imports in order to protect their rich farmers. Eliminating tariffs would do more for Africa than giving them an extra \$25 billion a year to squander. (It would also increase the wealth of the countries that eliminated their tariffs.) Since there are 650 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, the extra \$25 billion will increase per capita annual income (assuming it isn't squirreled away by corrupt elites) by only \$40. Not that such an increase is wholly trivial in relative terms—Nigeria, for example, has an annual per capita income of only about \$300, and it is not the poorest country in

Africa. But it is unlikely that the poorest people in these countries will benefit from the extra money; even if most of it isn't skimmed off by corrupt officials or squandered on dumb projects, it is likely to stave off fundamental political and economic reforms. (The G8 nations at Gleneagles also agreed to forgive some \$50 in African debts to them, but that is a one-time event and its annualized value is therefore much less than \$25 billion a year.)

Controls over how the money is spent will be difficult to implement. Earmarking donated money is especially difficult to enforce because the donee country can use the money to replace funds that it is already spending on the activity that the donation is earmarked for. So, for example, if money is earmarked for girls' education, the donee country can reduce the money that it appropriates out of its own funds for such education; such an evasion would be very difficult to prevent without intrusive monitoring of the country's finances that its leaders would resist vigorously and effectively in the name of anticolonialism.

## **PREFER OUR EVIDENCE**

( ) **AID TO AFRICA FAILS – PREFER OUR EVIDENCE – RELIES ON HISTORICAL EXAMPLES**

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 163] / ttate

Foreign aid in Africa must be changed for a number of reasons. The first is that, as a whole, it has not worked. The one clear success has been the fight against river blindness in West Africa, which took 25 years and a concerted partnership between donor governments and international pharmaceutical companies (sustained by active international secretariat) to overcome the parasite that was ruining the sight of millions of Africans, as well as the region's agriculture. Other ventures have been judged controversial rather than promising. The Chad – Cameroon Oil Pipeline, which was nearly blocked by international environmental and human rights groups, will transform the economy of Chad if the revenues are managed properly. Cultural exchange programs, particularly study trips to the United States for thousands of African intellectuals and professionals, and small grant programs supporting democracy and human rights have had a very positive impact in expanding the horizons and boosting the hopes of African reformers. But in areas meant to tackle poverty directly – clinics, schools, literacy programs, clean water supply, and sanitation – the foreign aid record in Africa has been deeply disappointing. Successes have been small, ephemeral, or too expensive to reproduce on a larger scale.

## **AID BAD – NO POLITICAL REFORM**

### **( ) AID DOES NOT LEAD TO POLITICAL REFORM**

**CALDERISI 2006** [Robert, senior administrator @ World Bank, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA, page 218-219 ] / ttate

Foreign aid, one might counter, is already dwindling. So why accelerate the process? Because aid is slowing the process of political change in Africa. For a long time, direct involvement in a large number of countries was considered necessary so as to have some influence, however refracted and obscured, on national policymaking. In the soft jargon of aid professionals, it was important to have a “place at the table.” In most countries, we should now just walk away from it.

In doing so, we would respect Julius Nyerere’s lucid thinking of a generation ago: “If our effort slackens, [donors] will – and they should – lose interest in cooperating with us for our benefit. And, in any case, we have no right to rely upon these countries. We can accept their willingness to help become self-reliant; we must not think of them as sources of charity which excuse us from work and sacrifice... There is a time for planting and a time for harvesting. I am afraid for us it is still a time for planting.”

## AID BAD – NO ECONOMIC REFORM

### **No positive influence—increases dependence**

USA Today, March 98

([http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1272/is\\_n2634\\_v126/ai\\_20409127](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_n2634_v126/ai_20409127))

Not only is there no positive correlation between aid levels and economic progress, but most recipients of assistance remain dependent on foreign transfers. As U. S. AID acknowledged in a 1989 report, "Only a handful of countries that started receiving U. S. assistance in the 1950s and 1960s has ever graduated from dependent status." Some nations have been on IMF programs for decades.

### **Internal economic freedom, not foreign aid solves.**

USA Today, March 98

([http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1272/is\\_n2634\\_v126/ai\\_20409127](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_n2634_v126/ai_20409127))

In the end, poor countries largely are responsible for their own destinies. Experience has demonstrated that sound domestic policies, not foreign aid, are what generate economic growth. The West's dramatic escape from poverty always has been a good place to start in attempting to understand development. The rapid economic and social progress of Europe, during which people first rose out of the dismal poverty that characterized most of human history, occurred mainly in countries that had a specific kind of regime -- classical liberalism -- which generally allowed markets to operate, respected the rule of law, protected private property, and permitted economic

competition. That experience has been repeated more quickly and spectacularly in East Asia, where it has taken a mere generation or two for desperately poor nations to be included among the world's most successful economies. That is not to say that the British or German, let alone the Japanese or South Korean, experiences were laissez faire. Rather, all broadly relied on market forces, despite varying degrees of government economic involvement.

### **The United States should cease to give aid—it harms domestic economies and doesn't solve conflicts.**

USA Today, March 98

([http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1272/is\\_n2634\\_v126/ai\\_20409127](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_n2634_v126/ai_20409127)) / awh

Foreign aid has been tried and found wanting. Aid transfers have not promoted self-sustaining economic development in the Third World. There is no positive correlation between foreign assistance and economic growth, and there is little evidence of causation in those nations that have succeeded economically. There is perhaps no greater tragedy today than that of the broken-down societies that dot the globe. However, there is no evidence that increased aid flows can prevent such human catastrophes in the future. Indeed, abundant foreign assistance to brutal and venal governments in the past helped create today's tragedies. The primary responsibility for development lies with Third World states themselves. Governments must create an economic environment wherein people are free to be productive. The industrialized nations can help -- primarily by doing no harm. The U. S. and other developed countries should allow poorer nations to participate more fully in the international marketplace. As the Congressional Budget Office has observed, "The broad economic policies of the major Western countries -- trade policies, budget deficits, growth rates, and the like -- generally exert greater influence on the economies of the developing countries than does aid." Access to the markets of wealthier nations is particularly important for poorer states. The World Bank's J. Michael Finger points out that Western protectionism reduces the Third World's GNP by a full three percentage points, twice the amount of foreign aid now provided by the industrialized nations. Mass poverty, famine, and murder blight the globe. Nevertheless, the understandable desire to do something should not become an excuse for maintaining the failed policies of the past. Foreign aid has not produced self-sustaining economic growth or prevented the collapse of numerous poor societies over the past five decades. It will do no better in the future.

## **AID BAD – DOES NOT SOLVE MALARIA**

**( ) WESTERN AID FAILS TO SOLVE FOR MALARIA – WE LACK THE KNOWLEDGE TO BE EFFECTIVE**

**EASTERLY 2006** [William, professor of economics @ New York University and senior fellow @ Center for Global Development, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN, pages 6-7]

So for the twelve-cent medicines, the Planners are distracted by simultaneously doing the other 448 interventions; they don't have enough local information to know how many children in each locale have malaria and how many doses of medicine are needed at each of the myriad health clinics; they don't have agents motivated to get those doses there; the local health workers are poorly paid and poorly motivated; many different aid agencies are doing many different interventions on the healthy system and on malaria; nobody knows who or what to blame if the twelve-cent medicines are out of stock in the local health clinic and do not reach the dying children; and the local parents don't even have a way of communicating to the Planners whether the medicines have reached them.

## **AID BAD – FOOD AID DOES NOT SOLVE**

### ( ) Turn—Food aid destroys local markets making famines inevitable

James Bovard, CATO policy analyst, 86

<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa065.html> / awh

U. S. Free Food Bankrupts Foreign Farmers Food for Peace is probably our most harmful foreign aid program. The United States is dumping over \$2 billion worth of surplus agricultural commodities a year on Third World Countries. Although sometimes alleviating hunger in the short run, the program often disrupts local agricultural markets and makes it harder for poor countries to feed themselves in the long run. Food for Peace was created in 1954 to help the Eisenhower administration get rid of embarrassingly large farm surpluses. The program aimed to benefit American farmers and the U. S. merchant marine and at the same time help hungry foreigners. In reality, it removes the evidence of the failure of our agricultural policies, often with little concern for the food recipients. In the 1950s and 1960s, massive U. S. wheat dumping in India disrupted that country's agricultural market and helped bankrupt thousands of Indian farmers. George Dunlop, chief of staff of the Senate Agriculture Committee, speculated that food aid may have been responsible for millions of Indians starving. [7] U. S. officials have conceded that massive food aid to Indonesia, Pakistan, and India in the 1960s "restricted agricultural growth . . . by allowing the governments to (1) postpone essential agricultural reforms, (2) fail to give agricultural investment sufficient priority, and (3) maintain a pricing system which gave farmers an inadequate incentive to increase production." [8] U. S. food aid is still having devastating effects. A report by the AID inspector general found that food aid "supported Government of Egypt policies . . . which have had a direct negative impact on domestic wheat production in Egypt." [9] AID administrator Peter McPherson has admitted his concern that U. S. food donations are still having an adverse effect on Egyptian agriculture. [10] In Haiti, U.S. free food is widely sold illegally in the country's markets next to the Haitian farmers' own crops. Governments often accept U. S. free food at the same time that they are repressing their own farmers, refusing to pay them what their crops are worth.

### ( ) Food Aid fuels war

USA Today, March 98

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1272/is\\_n2634\\_v126/ai\\_20409127](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_n2634_v126/ai_20409127) / awh

Indeed, foreign aid almost certainly helped create and aggravate problems in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire by subsidizing dictators whose rules proved especially disastrous. Among the most important causes of social division and catastrophe is what has been called "the overpolitized state," which is strengthened by government-to-government aid. Even the most humanitarian sounding aid -- such as Food for Peace shipments -- can accelerate social breakdown. Onetime relief worker Michael Maren has criticized a decade of assistance to Somalia. Of Western humanitarian personnel, he indicated in 1993. "Separately we'd arrived at the conclusion that the relief program was probably killing as many people as it was saving, and the net result was that Somali soldiers were supplementing their income by selling food, while the [Western Somali Liberation Front] -- often indistinguishable from the army -- was using the food as rations to fuel their attacks into Ethiopia." At the same time, food assistance discouraged local production and enhanced the central government's control over the people. Then, after the government collapsed, Western assistance worsened the chaos by enriching the local militias and discouraging local reconstruction efforts.

## **AID BAD – DOES NOT SOLVE SOFT POWER**

**Debt relief, farm subsidies, and textile quotas sour attempts to restore US leadership credibility through aid.**

Steven Radelet, *author of Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account*. 2003 (Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82508/steven-radelet/bush-and-foreign-aid.html>) / braswell

Third, foreign aid alone will not be enough. Although most of the burden lies with the governments of developing countries to implement sound policies, Washington must rethink some of its nonaid policies that affect these nations, especially in the area of trade. It is no secret that U.S. textile quotas have long denied jobs to workers in poor countries. Initiatives such as the Clinton administration's African Growth and Opportunity Act, now embraced by the *Bush* administration, should hardly be trumpeted as the United States' "giving" something to poor countries, since the legislation only slightly reduces existing barriers and leaves significant obstacles untouched. Other policies raise new barriers, the most pernicious being the 2002 farm bill. Its large subsidies tilted the playing field even more in favor of U.S. farmers and led to large drops in world commodity prices (especially cotton), seriously harming farmers in developing countries. European farm subsidies do even more damage, but that is no excuse for the United States to further impoverish poor farmers around the world. These policies are precisely the kinds of actions that deepen resentment and distrust of the United States and make its espoused commitment to openness and prosperity for all ring hollow. Other areas calling for urgent improvement include debt-relief, health, and climate change policies that affect developing nations.

## SACHS INDICT

### (\_\_ ) SACHS' PROPOSALS LACK EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

**EASTERLY 2006** [William, professor of economics @ New York University and senior fellow @ Center for Global Development, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN, page 6]

Columbia University professor and director of the United Nations Millennium Project Jeffrey Sachs is an eloquent and compassionate man. I am always moved to listen to him speak. Unfortunately, his intellectual solutions are less convincing. Professor Sachs offers a Big Plan to end world poverty, with solutions ranging from nitrogen-fixing leguminous trees to replenish soil fertility, to antiretroviral therapy for AIDS, to specially programmed cell phones to provide real-time data to health planners, to rainwater harvesting, to battery-charging stations, to twelve-cent medicines for children with malaria – for a total of 449 interventions. Professor Sachs has played an important role in calling upon the West to do more for the Rest, but the implementation strategy is less constructive. According to Professor Sachs and the Millennium Project, the UN secretary-general should run the plan, coordinating the actions of officials in six UN agencies, the UN country teams, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and a couple of dozen rich-country aid agencies. This Plan is the latest in a long string of Western plans to end poverty.